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Several developing economies witnessed a large number of systemic financial and currency 
crises since the 1980s which resulted in severe economic, social, and political problems. The 
devastating impact of the 1982 and 1994-95 Mexican crises, the 1997-98 Asian financial 
crisis, the 1998 Russian crisis and the ongoing financial crisis of 2008-2009 suggest that 
maintaining financial sector stability through reduction of vulnerability is highly crucial. The 
world is now witnessing an unprecedented systemic financial crisis originated from USA in 
September 2008 together with a deep worldwide economic recession, particularly in 
developed countries of Europe and North America. This calls for devising and using on a 
regular basis an appropriate and effective monitoring and policy formulation system for 
detecting and addressing vulnerabilities leading to crisis. This paper proposes a 
macroprudential/financial soundness monitoring, analysis and remedial policy formulation 
system that can be used by most developing countries with or without crisis experience as 
well as developed countries with limited data. It also discusses a process for identifying, and 
compiling a set of leading macroprudential indicators/financial soundness indicators. An 
empirical illustration using Philippines data is presented. 
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Over the last decade, many developing countries have become increasingly integrated into 
global financial markets through deregulation, liberalization, particularly through liberalization of 
the capital account, and privatization of the market. Several emerging market economies 
witnessed a large number of financial crises since the 1980s which resulted in severe economic, 
social, and political problems. The devastating impact of the 1982 and 1994-95 Mexican crises, 
the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis and the 1998 Russian crisis suggest that maintaining financial 
sector stability through reduction of vulnerability is highly crucial.  
 
However, financial crises were not limited to developing countries only. In the last decade, 
several industrial countries, such as some countries in Europe (European currency crisis in 
1992-93), Japan and some of the Nordic countries also witnessed financial crises that had 
significant macroeconomic consequences. Recently, the world has witnessed an unprecedented 
systemic financial crisis originating from the USA in September 2008. This has been followed by 
a deep worldwide economic recession. In this crisis, developed countries of Europe and North 
America were affected severely.  
 
In order to reduce vulnerability to crisis, developing countries as well as developed countries 
should have sound economic policies, flexible exchange rate, effective institutions, good 
governance, particularly well supervised financial markets and an appropriate monitoring 
system for vulnerability leading to crisis. This calls for devising an appropriate monitoring and 
policy formulation system for detecting and addressing financial vulnerabilities. 
 
Past and present crises show that we have not learned enough on how to prevent them. What 
can be learned from this is that it is extremely difficult to accurately predict crises, particularly 
their timing.  So it is important to be prepared for crises if it cannot be fully   prevented and to 
detect the crises early in order to minimize their impact and limit their damaging after effects.  
 
As financial sectors are highly vulnerable to instability and systemic risk, monitoring these 
sectors as well as spillover effects of weaknesses in the real sector assumes great importance 
in light of the severity and frequency of financial crises, especially keeping in mind the combined 
currency and banking collapses of the past decade. The main question that arises is what can 
be done to reduce the damage of these events. Is it possible to maintain a moderate degree of 
stability in the financial markets of a region with liberalized capital flows? In any case, there is a 
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need for increased effort for reducing vulnerability to crisis.  Therefore, an appropriate and 
effective system for early vulnerability detection and remedial policy formulation is clearly vital 
for reducing vulnerability to crisis. 
 
Some progress has been made in identifying and compiling accurate and timely crisis-
monitoring indicators. The focus has now shifted towards the development of techniques for the 
proper analyses and interpretation of data since no universally accepted standard or system of 
macroprudential analysis exists. Many countries, particularly crisis-affected ones are now 
analyzing crisis-monitoring or macroprudential indicators (MPIs)/Financial Soundness Indicators 
(FSIs). However, this analysis does not usually lead to remedial policy formulation and actions. 
There seems to be a disconnect between the analysis of MPIs and the remedial policy 
formulation. 
 
This paper proposes a macroprudential surveillance and remedial policy formulation system that 
can be used by most developing countries with or without crisis experience to detect economic 
and financial sector vulnerability, design appropriate policy responses and undertake preventing 
actions to address vulnerabilities. The proposed system outlines a process for identifying and 
compiling a set of leading MPIs, and methods for macroprudential analysis and a process for 
formulating remedial policy actions for addressing vulnerability. It focuses on high frequency 
monitoring financial sector vulnerability and spillover effects of weakness in the real sector for 
early detection of irregularities and swift remedial policy actions. Furthermore, an empirical 
illustration of the system using Philippines’ data is presented. 
 
Need for a Comprehensive Monitoring System 
 
The cost of a financial crisis could be severe in terms of reserve losses, output decline and 
poverty. Usually, governments or taxpayers incur huge fiscal costs by any standard. Costs 
measured by output losses are comparatively less but still large. Financial sector vulnerability 
affects the macroeconomy through several channels, such as credit crunch, high interest 
spreads, low financial intermediation, lending caution, disruption of the payments system. It also 
affects the effectiveness of monetary policy due to low monetarization, volatility in monetary 
aggregates, rates unresponsiveness to open market operations, stickiness in interest rates, and 
high non-performing loans.  
 
According to a paper on the Copenhagen Consensus,
3 Eichengreen (2004) states, “The loss 
from the average or typical financial crisis is around 9% of GDP (see Bordo et. al., 2001 for 
details), and the severe crises, such as those of Argentina and Indonesia, caused output or 
GDP to fall over 20%, an economic loss higher than those incurred due to the Great 
Depression. According to Chen and Ravallion (2001), the 1997 Asian financial crisis increased 
the number of people below poverty line in the region by 22 million. Even though one can 
question the accuracy of such estimates, the avoidance of such crises could benefit emerging-
market economies by $107 billion a year.”  
 
In 1997 and 1998, sudden outflows of capital from several East Asian countries, such as 
Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand reeled from a devastating 
financial crisis, which resulted in severe economic, social, and political problems. Their open 
financial markets sparked a plunge in their currencies, stocks and other assets and severely 
damaged some of their financial institutions. Economies contracted and the standards of living 
of millions of people worsened. Economic development was set back for years in some areas.  
                                                 
3 Paper written on Copenhagen Consensus and presented at Copenhagen on 25-28 May 2004.  
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The Asian financial crisis has demonstrated how financial integration could expose developing 
counties to external shocks. These shocks reversed the success in poverty reduction in some 
countries from openness of the financial markets and caused a significant increase in poverty in 
the short to medium term. Following years of robust growth and strides in the standard of living, 
and export expansion, these economies suffered from a crippling devaluation, massive capital 
flight, corporate and banking failures, and spikes in unemployment. In a relatively short span of 
time, close to US$100 billion of capital flew out of the region.  
 
The Mexican Peso crisis of 1995 witnessed its worst recession in 60 years. The real GDP 
declined by 6% ((Goldstein et. al., 2000). According to a study by Baldaccci et  al. (2002), the 
1994-95 Mexican financial crisis gave rise to an increase in poverty and some cases, income 
inequality. The incidence of poverty as defined by poverty head count ratio increased by around 
6% to reach 17% in 1996 from 10.6% in 1994, reversing the reduction in poverty made between 
1992 and 1994. An important lesson to be learnt from the Asian financial crisis and the Mexican 
Peso crisis is that adequate social safety nets for households should be in place prior to the 
integration of domestic financial markets. 
  
The economic loss in terms of reserves was $150 billion to $200 billion and an official exchange 
market intervention was undertaken during the Exchange Rate Mechanism Crisis (ERM) of 
1992-93 to control the devaluation and/or floating of ERM currencies without any success.  
 
The sub-prime mortgage market crisis, which originated in U.S. in September 2008, has had a 
devastating effect on the U.S. and EU's financial system through the bursting of the housing 
bubble, bankruptcies and the ensuing credit crisis.  The crisis has led to a major global 
recession which has been coursed through three major channels, namely, export collapse, 
reversal of capital flows, and the weakening of market confidence. Experts are referring to this 
as the first global recession in the new era of globalization (Bhattacharyay and Dey, 2009). 
Ongoing financial and economic crisis has a devastating impact worldwide in terms of the 
economic and financial losses, and the full magnitude of its impact is yet to be assessed. 
 
It is in this context that the effective monitoring of financial sectors as well as the assessment of 
the spillover effects of weaknesses in the real sector assumes great importance. The monitoring 
system should be able to detect the magnitude and nature of economic and financial 
vulnerability at an early stage and suggest appropriate policy actions to address them to prevent 
a potential financial or currency crisis. The monitoring and early warning system should not be 
very complicated so that high frequency monitoring can be performed.  
 
The virulence of the contagion among neighboring countries as well as other trade partners 
highlights the need for a regional surveillance mechanism, particularly the peer review process 
to prevent future crises and financial instability or to minimize their impacts in the region. At the 
same time, recent financial crisis calls for an effective global surveillance system supported by 
appropriate and effective regional and national surveillance systems.  
 
Financial Vulnerability and Causes 
 
It is important to define what financial vulnerability is and what its causes are prior to developing 
a system for its monitoring. The first question is what the primary reasons behind crises are. 
Prior to 1970s, the majority of crises were “Current Account” or “Balance of Payment Problem” 
crises. Theses crises were primarily due to inconsistency of macroeconomic policies, such as 
highly expansionary domestic policy with fixed exchange rate pegs or a massive deterioration in 
the terms of trade with a highly restrictive trade regime. During 1990s, emerging markets  
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witnessed rapidly growing capital inflows resulting in much higher debt in the private sector 
compared to the official sector. Therefore, most crises in 1990s were so called “Capital Account 
Crises” that occur when owners of the country’s debt lose confidence in country’s capability to 
service its debt in the future. Countries with fixed exchange rate pegs and open capital accounts 
are highly vulnerable to capital account crisis when markets anticipate that exchange rate or 
debt service sustainability will not be maintained. The resultant collapse of the value of the 
currency will lead to a currency crisis. And the resultant failure to honor the debt servicing by 
banks and other financial institutions will increase financial vulnerability of the financial system 
leading to a banking or financial crisis.  
 
Financial vulnerability is a complex and dynamic concept, and therefore, it is difficult to explain. 
At present, there is no universally accepted definition for financial vulnerability (Osterelo and De 
Haan, 2003).  Following the definition of the financial stability of Houben et. al. (2004), financial 
vulnerability can be defined as a situation in the financial system in which it cannot allocate 
resources efficiently between activities and across time and cannot assess and manage 
financial risk, thereby weakening economic performance and wealth accumulation. At the same 
time, the system is not capable of absorbing shocks or vulnerability and thus cannot prevent 
adverse impacts. It is easy to measure the solvency of a financial institution but very difficult to 
measure the extent of vulnerability in a financial system.  
 
There are several causes of financial vulnerability. The major reasons include: (i) fragility of the 
financial sector or system, (ii) weakness in prudential regulations and supervisions, (iii) spillover 
effects of weaknesses in the real sector such as real estate, mortgage and non-bank financial 
sectors, credit cards, and derivative markets, (iv) weaknesses in governance of financial 
institutions and their supervising authorities and risk management, (v) macroeconomic policy 
mismatch of financial and monetary policies, (vi) contagion effects, (vii) weaknesses in the 
international financial system or markets, (viii) sudden financial liberalization and (ix) 
weaknesses in legal infrastructure. Ideally, all such possible causes should be monitored. This 
paper will focus on monitoring the vulnerability of the financial sector as well as spillover effects 
of weaknesses in the real sector. 
 
Contagion is a difficult concept to define. It can be defined as the transmission of a financial 
crisis to a country as a result of its real and financial interdependence with other countries that 
are already witnessing a financial crisis (Fratzscher, 2002). On many occasions these financial 
crisis does not happen solely in one country but instead has a contagion effect to other 
countries in the region as well. For example, the Latin American crisis of 1994 and the Asian 
crisis of 1997 affected many countries in the respective regions and sometimes across 
countries. Since July 2, 1997 following the devaluations of Thailand’s currency, the local 
currencies of Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines and later Singapore rapidly weakened. This crisis 
also adversely affected several non-Asian developing countries including Russia and Brazil due 
to the market perception of increased vulnerabilities in all emerging market economies.  
 
The Asian crisis spawned a massive literature on the economics of crisis, in which numerous 
hypotheses have been advanced on the origin, development, and resolution of crises.  There 
are however two main explanations for the Asian crisis. First generation models attributed the 
crisis to weak economic fundamentals such as unsustainable economic policies, vulnerability of 
the financial sector, and structural imbalances. This traces the crisis to inconsistency in policies 
such as monetization of persistently large budget deficits under a regime of fixed exchange 
rates (Krugman 1979). Second generation models, on the other hand, linked the crisis to the 
arbitrary shifts in market sentiments and emphasized the role of panics and self-fulfilling 




The general understanding is that the financial crisis in Asia was multifaceted such as a 
combination of capital account, currency and banking crises. As Pesenti and Tille (2000) 
emphasize, the fundamental imbalances stressed by first generation models make a country 
vulnerable to shifts in investor sentiment; thereafter, once the crisis has begun, the second 
generation models explain the spiral and self-fulfilling nature of speculations.  
 
The ongoing financial crisis started in September 2008 in USA is an outbreak of (i) gross 
financial irregularities(particularly of off-balance-sheet activities of financial institutions), (ii) the 
excesses in the housing and mortgage-backed securities markets, (iii) excessive risk taking, (iv) 
excess savings in emerging market economies with very low global interest rates causing 
speculation and asset market bubbles, (v) large global imbalances, and (vi) loose monetary 
policies in the U.S. since the 2002 recession, among others. The excess savings in emerging 
market economies, particularly in Asia was termed one of the major causes to the ongoing 
crisis. Asia's excess savings invested in advanced economies at a low interest rate facilitate 
overspending by advanced economies’ consumer.   
 
Proposed Vulnerability Detection and Remedial Policy Formulation System 
 
Monitoring the soundness of the financial sectors in countries is the backbone of crisis 
prevention and an extremely challenging task. As stated earlier, it is easy to measure solvency 
of a financial institution but very difficult to measure the vulnerability of a financial system.   
Regular monitoring of the financial markets allows the early detection of significant fragilities 
within the financial system that may destabilize the sector. This also involves discovery of 
potential disturbances emerging from outside the banking system. Early detection and timely 
recognition of financial vulnerability will allow policymakers to trigger preemptive policy 
measures, aid financial supervisors to formulate and implement corrective measures, and allow 
businesses to adjust their business strategies. In this regard, it is imperative for a country to 
develop an appropriate system for early detection of any vulnerability in the financial system.  
 
Monitoring can be carried out by different groups/sectors⎯markets, firms, consumers, 
policymakers, regional and international financial institutions, supervisory groupings, peer 
groups and countries with strong trade or economic links⎯with each level having differing 
approaches and objectives. However, for monitoring to be effective, it must not only be correct 
but it must be implemented properly. Monitoring domestic markets and institutions as well as 
implementing stability oriented policies should be undertaken by the countries themselves and 
should not be left to multilateral organizations, regional and international financial institutions.  
Ideally, high frequency monitoring should be performed by a high level monitoring committee 
with representations from central banks, the ministry of finance and other relevant ministries and 
supervisory authorities. 
 
The proposed system outlines a process for identifying and compiling a set of leading MPIs, and 
methods for macroprudential analysis that will serve as flexible tools for analyzing and 
interpreting fluctuations in MPIs and translating underlying information to measure the 
magnitude and nature of vulnerability (or strength) and remedial policy implications for 
addressing vulnerability. The system involves the following steps:  
 
(i)  identification and compilation of leading indicators to represent key sectors of the 
domestic economy, such as Money, Credit and Interest Rates, Banking, Public 
Finance, External Debt and International Flows. Trade and International Reserves, 
Stock Market and Business Tendency Survey for Corporate Sector (some indicators  
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for the external sector or global economy as well as those of major trading partners 
could also be included) 
(ii)  estimation of benchmark or threshold values for each indicator;  
(iii)  use of a signaling method for vulnerability assessment;  
(iv)  trend analysis and/or stress testing for indicators giving warning signals; and 
(v)  policy analysis for remedial policy recommendations to address vulnerabilities.  
 
This system will serve as a basis for any preventive and remedial measures to address detected 
weaknesses in the economy and the financial system. A graphic representation of the 
framework is shown in Figure 1. Each of the above steps is explained in detail below. This high 
frequency of monitoring should be done fortnightly or monthly.  
 
Identification and Compilation of an Appropriate Set of Macroprudential/ Financial 
Soundness Indicators  
 
The availability of accurate and timely information is very important as demonstrated by the 
recent financial crisis in Asia, which highlighted the informational gaps in the affected 
economies. To illustrate, the build-up of currency and maturity mismatches, which had been the 
core among the weakness of several financial systems in Asia, was masked initially by the high 
economic growth rates, manageable inflation, and heady capital inflows. This lack of 
transparency contributed to the vulnerability because in a world of global capital flows, crises 
can arise if information surprises cause market participants to sharply change their 
expectations. In contrast, transparency and a continual flow of market information can help 
avoid panics and “creditor-grab” behavior.  The lack of data and weak rules of disclosure, at that 














           
 
Figure 1: A Macroprudential Analysis and Remedial Policy Formulation 
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In recent years, particularly since the crisis, there are several studies proposing crisis monitoring 
indicators or early warning indicators that could be used to monitor the vulnerability of an 
economy.  Bhattacharyay (2004) reviewed developments in the identification, compilation, 
analysis and interpretation of MPIs /FSIs. For many developing countries, it is quite difficult to 
estimate the crisis monitoring indicators due to the lack of timely and appropriate data.  The 
majorities of official statistics is available after considerable time lag and are not very useful in 
estimating early warning indicators. 
 
Compilation and analysis of MPIs are important components in theeconomic and financial 
sector monitoring activity. MPIs are a broad set of indicators that reflect the vulnerability of the 
financial and real economic system to shocks. MPIs include macroeconomic variables, such as 
inflation, asset prices, and interest rates in the economy and aggregated microprudential 
indicators, such as capital adequacy, asset quality, commodity price risk, and sovereign yield 
spread.  
 
The development of MPIs is rather recent. The tools that are utilized to quantify and qualify the 
soundness and vulnerabilities of the financial system are varied and can potentially be made as 
complex or sophisticated as needed. Macroprudential analysis is a technique that uses 
information from MPIs to assess and monitor the strength and vulnerabilities of the financial 
system. Depending on the complexity, the operation of a monitoring system demands resources 
and technical expertise. The more sophisticated the system, the more costly it is to monitor and 
conduct macroprudential analysis. MPIs encompass FSIs and other relevant information that 
can provide a broad picture of a country’s economic and financial condition such as the status of 
the institutional and regulatory frameworks, and compliance with international standards 
(Sundararajan et al. 2002). FSIs are a special subset of MPIs that specifically monitor the health 
and soundness of financial institutions and markets, and their corporate and household 
counterparts.  
 
The effectiveness of the monitoring system should be evaluated according to the purpose with 
which they are designed. For instance, MPI analysis should be evaluated on how well it can 
track the vulnerability of a financial system as well as how it can effectively disseminate 
information to economic agents in the pursuit of better disclosure. Early warning systems can be 
evaluated on their record in predicting a crisis. Despite the increasing interest in more complex 
techniques employed in deploying monitoring and early warning systems (see Berg and Patillo 
1999b for a review), it should be keptin mind that there are at least two aspects in monitoring: 
technical identification and interpretation of the indicators. It is thus important not only to define 
the purposes to which the indicators are to be used but also the analytical framework within 
which they are to be interpreted.  
 
Given that financial and currency crises are complex phenomena, the identified set of MPIs 
should be comprehensive in nature. In this light, the MPIs need not be limited only to banking 
and financial statistics but have to take into account the general macroeconomy as well as the 
corporate and household sectors. In this manner, a more comprehensive assessment of the 
condition and health of the economy and financial systems can be conducted. At the same time 
identification of MPIs should be a dynamic process depending on the emerging vulnerability in 
certain sectors of the economy, such as emerging vulnerability in the insurance sector and 
credit card and consumer loans businesses. 
 
Maintaining a wide set of indicators, however, has a downside -- collecting and monitoring a 
multiplicity of variables can be a daunting task, and can ultimately entail large costs. However, 
these costs can be reduced if it is possible to identify, from among the many different indicators,  
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a manageable subset of core indicators, which can effectively give signals of vulnerability to a 
crisis. To illustrate, one of the criteria for choosing a core set of variables is whether the 
indicators are leading or coincident. Identifying a core set of indicators is not an easy task and 
work in this area, like the IMF system of MPI is still considered a work in progress.  For work on 
MPIs to be fruitful, it has to be harmonious with the existing monitoring system of the country, 
taking into account the data constraints faced by the different countries.  Different structures, 
levels of economic development and degrees of financial sophistication imply that different sets 
of MPIs are relevant to specific countries. 
 
Ideally, the set of monitoring indicators should include appropriate FSIs in terms of liquidity, 
credit, market risks and banking health/soundless and other MPIs on macroeconomic 
vulnerability which may have spillover effects on the financial sector. 
 
Under a regional technical assistance project, Asian Development Bank (ADB) conducted an 
inception workshop in April 2000 with the participating countries, which included Fiji; Indonesia; 
Philippines; Thailand; Taipei, China; and Viet Nam, and, in consultation with representatives 
from IMF, BIS, Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt, Bank of Japan, Bank of Korea, Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, United Nation ESCAP. A set of 67 commonly agreed MPIs were identified 
during the workshop, belonging to the following groups of indicators, (i) External Debt and 
Financial Flows (8 indicators); (ii) Money and Credit (17 indicators); (iii) Banking (14 indicators); 
(iv) Interest Rates (12 indicators); (v) Stock Markets and Bonds (9 indicators); (vi) Trade 
Exchange and International Reserves (10 indicators); (vii) Business Survey Data (9 indicators): 
mainly Manufacturing but also Construction, Retail, and Wholesale Trade and Services.   
Bhattacharyay (2001) discussed the above commonly agreed indicators in detail. A list of the 
ADB commonly agreed indicators is given in Appendix 1.  
 
Following the selection of the commonly agreed indicators, an attempt was made to identify a 
core set of 22 leading indicators that could give early warning signals of vulnerability of financial 
markets, based on graphical analysis of the series of MPIs compiled by countries. 
Bhattacharyay and Nerb (2002) identified a core set of leading indicators, based on trend 
analysis of the 67 commonly agreed MPIs compiled by selected crisis-affected Asian countries 
under the aforementioned ADB-supported project. Indicators that exhibited conspicuous 
behavior prior to 1997 Asian financial crisis were selected (Appendix 2). This core set of leading 
MPIs that gave warning signals or had large fluctuations prior to a crisis were selected as 
leading indicators. In cases where a clear lead could not be detected, it was labeled as 
coincident/leading. Further details on this method can be found in Bhattacharyay and Nerb 
(2002). 
 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been actively involved in the development of 
MPIs/FSIs. IMF (2001a) proposed a broad array of MPIs that could give a comprehensive 
assessment of the financial system and subsequently a core set of FSIs (Sundararajan et al. 
2002) that are more useful and convenient for periodic monitoring.  These aggregated MPIs 
mainly adopt the CAMELS framework, which is comprised of six groups of indicators reflecting 
the health of financial institutions: capital adequacy, asset quality, management soundness, 
earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk. The final set of IMF core and encouraged 
indicators are available in Compilation Guide on FSI (IMF, 2004) which provide guidance on the 
concepts and definitions, sources and techniques, for their compilation and dissemination.   
 
One of the main objectives of identifying a core set of leading indicators is to identify indicators 
that appear to be particularly promising for financial and economic monitoring, and which 
therefore should be included in a core list of indicators. Although a broad and exhaustive set of  
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indicators could potentially give a more complete assessment, they can be costly to compile and 
unwieldy to maintain. For the purpose of periodic high frequency monitoring, a separate core set 
of MPIs of manageable size should be kept and updated regularly.  
 
As indicated earlier, one criterion for inclusion in the core set of MPIs is early warning capacity. 
Hence, the MPI should be a leading indicator or at the very least, a coincident one. A MPI is a 
leading indicator if it sends early vulnerability signals and coincident if it signals simultaneously 
with vulnerability. For a short-term monitoring system, however, only indicators that are 
available on a monthly or quarterly (at least) basis can be useful. Unfortunately, not all countries 
are able to fulfill this requirement.  
 
The data series for many developing countries are not very long and are not always complete 
over the whole time span. Many aggregated microprudential indicators are not yet available for 
many countries. This prevents the use of formal statistical methods like regression or factor 
analysis to identify the best candidates for a harmonized set of core MPIs. Nevertheless, this 
should be done in a later stage to identify the exact informational content of those series and to 
estimate the joint impact of different subsets of indicators for explaining and forecasting banking 
and currency crises. 
 
The selection of core indicators should be harmonious with the existing monitoring system of the 
country and take into account the data constraints.  A country should adopt an appropriate core 
set of indicators from ADB commonly agreed, IMF FSIs and other suitable indicators from crisis-
related studies. The selected indicators should be  tailor-made for a country’s specific 
characteristics, based on economic rationale and early warning capability and available for high 
frequency monitoring.  
 
 
Macroprudential Indicators: Analysis and Interpretation of MPIs 
 
Some progress has been made in identifying and compiling accurate and timely MPIs. The 
focus is now beginning to shift towards the development of techniques for the proper analyses 
and interpretation of data. Work on the analysis of MPIs and their interpretation is still recent 
and there is no consensus on the best analytic framework for determining the vulnerability of a 
financial system or a set of widely accepted MPIs. It needs be appreciated that the task of 
macroprudential analysis or the framework for identifying, analyzing, and interpreting MPIs is 
still a work-in-progress.  
 
Various international and regional financial institutions, such as the IMF, Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS), and European Central Bank (ECB) as well as private institutions are still in 
the process of developing or testing different systems. In general, most macroprudential 
analysis is based on trend analysis and the identifications of large movements in the level of 
selected MPIs (without comparing with a threshold and critical values) for assessing 
risk/vulnerability leading to a crisis. These methods usually analyze a composite of 
macroeconomic and microeconomic prudential indicators. Most macroprudential analysis is 
judgmental together with other tools of macroprudential assessment. As such, there is no 
standard system for macroprudential analysis at present. Yet, as the experience of the Asian 
crisis shows, a systematic monitoring of the financial and economic systems is an important 
element in crisis prevention strategies.  
 
There are several studies that are based on empirical analysis on countries that have been 
affected by crisis in past.  The identified indicators have been found useful to predict the past  
 
12
crisis based with a high probability on past time-series data.  However, it is not sure whether the 
same indicators would be able to predict future crisis with a reasonable degree of accuracy.  At 
the same time, it is not possible to predict the timing of the start of the crisis.   Another major 
problem in crisis-monitoring activities is wrongly predicting vulnerability that may cause a 
confidence problem in the market and thus may initiate a crisis.  Therefore, it is not clear if the 
use of quantitative models for predicting probabilities of a crisis is useful.   
 
Another major obstacle is to come up with an appropriate threshold a value or benchmark 
beyond which signifies vulnerability for each indicator. When the level of an indicator is large (or 
small), the vulnerability is high. However, there are no benchmarks on how large should be the 
magnitude of the indicator as no norms are available and there is an urgent need to develop 
benchmarks. 
 
Macroprudential analysis should not be limited to quantitative indicators alone.  Qualitative 
information is very important. This includes credit ratings by international credit rating agencies 
 
At present, several developing countries conduct macroprudential analysis as well as many 
developed countries based on the trends of available MPIs, noting any large or significant 
movements and on the basis of expert judgment.  Any particular kind of risk, such as liquidity 
risk has to be assessed based on a set of related indicators and proper judgment has to be 
used to detect any significant vulnerability 
 
There are several existing methods that use MPIs to monitor economic and financial 
vulnerability. The major methods include: (i) trend analysis, which detects vulnerability when 
there are major fluctuations in a particular indicator; (ii) stress-testing, which gauges 
vulnerability by estimating the impact of a range of future shocks to the system on certain 
variables; and (iii) Early Warning Signal (EWS) models, which estimate the probability of a crisis 
occurring through quantitative or econometric techniques. A country should adopt an 
appropriate framework tailor-made for its specific characteristics using all or some of the above 
methods for macroprudetnial analysis. The brief explanations of the above methods are 
presented in the following sections.   
 
Trend Analysis  
 
Trend analysis entails looking at the movement of data over a given period of time and taking 
note of deviations from an observed pattern or large fluctuations. The major drawback of this 
technique lies in the interpretation of notable data deviation. It would not be immediately 
apparent if this signifies stress in the system or simply a result of structural breaks due to 
changes in regulations or regimes. As it is somewhat subjective,the reliability of trend analysis 
depends largely on the skill and experience of the technical staff. It is currently the most 
common method used because it is cost-effective, transparent, and simple enough to be easily 
grasped by policymakers.  
Stress Testing 
 
Stress testing is a multi-step simulation process or method of examining key risks, 
vulnerabilities and exposures in an economic or financial system It is designed to evaluate 
vulnerability against major changes or shocks in the system. It provides  information on the 
behavior of a system under exceptional but plausible shocks or the impact of a range of future 
shocks to certain variables of the a system.  It estimates changes in the MPI due to a specific 
type or set of shocks that are based on historical or hypothetical (but plausible) circumstances, 
i.e., the impact of an economic slowdown on the level of nonperforming loans. Stress tests,  
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however, do not estimate the probability of the shock occurring. Stress testing is regularly used 
in the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) of the IMF/ World Bank (Sundararajan et 
al. 2002 and IMF and World Bank, 2003). IMF (2001b) provided further details on stress testing. 
Blascke et. al. (2001) presented an overview of issues, methodologies and FSAP experience 
regarding stress tests.   
 
The stress testing involves the following steps: 
 
(i) Identifying  major  vulnerabilities, risks and exposure or potential sources of shocks, 
such as interest rates, exchange rates, credits, equity prices, liquidity, inter-bank 
contagion, real estates, key exports, key commodities- in terms of fall in prices and 
volatility;  
(ii)  Defining coverage and identifying data: all systemically relevant institutions and 
exposures; 
(iii)  Calibrating shocks and scenarios: establishing key linkages between the financial 
system and the real economy- a formal macroeconomic model or macro-simulation 
models.  
(iv)  Selecting and implementing methodology-crunching numbers: translating the various 
output of the macroeconomic model into financial institutions balance sheet and 
income statements.  
(v)  Interpreting and using the results: policy makers compare the impact of a common 
set of shocks on different institutions. For interpreting stress tests, one should 
consider the limits and assumptions on which they are built ( Jones et. al., 2004 and 
Cihak, 2003) 
 
Stress test has some limitations. Like trend analysis, it also relies on the judgment and 
experience of monitoring staff to identify the proper set of scenarios to be used in the test and to 
interpret the result correctly-only first order approximation to the true potential loss exposure. It 
does not capture the full range and interaction of risk exposure (such as operational and legal 
risk). It should be compared with other measure of risk exposure such as empirical analysis of 
macro-prudential/ financial soundless indicators. Moreover, it is complicated and time-
consuming and hence difficult to undertake frequently, which makes it an inappropriate tool for 
high frequency monitoring. Furthermore it is a resource intensive process in terms of technical 
expertise, data requirement and budget.  
 
Early Warning Signal (EWS) Models 
 
Early warning signal models were developed to estimate the probability of a crisis occurring 
based on the movement of MPIs. Early warning models based on MPI are relatively new 
approaches introduced and discussed in academic and policy circles. Some of the more recent 
work in this area are Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999); Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998); 
Goldstein, Kaminsky, and Reinhart (2000); Berg and Patillo (1999); Edison (2000); and Berg et 
al. (2004). This is used in the private financial institutions like Goldman Sachs and Credit Suisse 
First Boston (Berg and Petillo 2004).  
 
EWS models estimates the probability of a crisis occurring through quantitative or econometric 
techniques based on the movement of MPI’s. It is a sound and objective methods for early 
warning.  
 
There are generally two types of EWS models, one that is based on a composite of leading 
indicators and another that makes use of probit/logit models. The composite indicator model  
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creates a composite figure using the number of “warning signals” obtained from a set of MPIs 
and directly tying it with a probability of a crisis. A warning signal is emitted whenever an 
indicator is theoretically associated to a crisis breaches a critical threshold (Kaminsky, Lizondo, 
and Reinhart, 1998). Probit or logit models, on the other hand, compute a probability of a crisis 
occurring based on changes in behavior of indicators prior to crises (Berg et al. 1999). There 
are separate EWS models for currency and banking crises. No common model is available for 
predicting any types of crisis.  
 
However, the predictive accuracy of the existing early warning models are limited as noted in 
the existing literature (Berg and Patillo 2000). The financial market is highly complex and the 
composite index technique used in most EWS models is too simplistic to capture the nuances of 
the sector. Indices are also potentially misleading because in the process of producing a single 
figure to capture the effect of a set of indicators, positive and negative signals of individual 
components may cancel each other out (Evans et al. 2000). The quantitative models such as 
probit and logit, on the other hand, have mixed performance in detecting a crisis or financial 
vulnerability especially in the context of out-of-sample forecasting. EWS are also complicated, 
expensive, and nontransparent, and require extensive time-series data, which is not always 
available for some countries and certain variables (Berg, Borenzstein and Petillo, 2004). 
 
Also, countries that did not experience a crisis, can not build a EWS model using its data series. 
Most countries do not compile IMF FSIs and a few countries have started to compile FSIs very 
recently. EWS models are, therefore, not suitable for high frequency monitoring.  
 
The choice of approach in analyzing and interpreting MPIs would depend on several factors, 
such as the desired level of accuracy, cost, timeliness, purpose and nature of policy action 
expected, and technical capacity of monitoring personnel and policy makers. Clearly, there are 
trade-offs among these factors. For instance, simple methods can generate indicators faster 
than more complicated ones but it may only be adequate if the goal is simply to alert the 
authorities on possible vulnerabilities in the system. It may not be able to generate specific 
probabilities to the occurrence of crises that more sophisticated techniques can provide.  
 
A fundamental issue to consider is whether crises are predictable which, as the literature 
suggest, is still subject to qualifications. However, using MPIs to predict the probability of an 
impending crisis using a EWS model may be time-consuming and will be of limited use if it 
arrives after the onset of the crisis or with insufficient time left to avert it. At the same time, these 
kinds of models, so far, have not performed well in predicting the occurrence of a crisis, 
especially for out-of-sample data (Berg, Borenzstein and Petillo, 2004). The choice of the model 
is also determined by the technical capacity of the agents maintaining the models. The cost and 
technical capacity required to regularly undertake MPI analysis also vary with the complexity of 
the technique, with more sophisticated methods requiring more resources and highly trained 
staff. In the end, the trade off between sophistication/complexity and accuracy is cost. 
 
In view of the above, quantitative EWS models can not be used alone to monitor financial 
vulnerability leading to a crisis. Trend analysis, stress testing and other traditional surveillance 




A Proposed Quantitative Monitoring System  
 
Now, a proposed quantitative Monitoring system using 30 selected MPIs is presented below.  
 
Identification and Compilation of MPIs 
 
The framework proposed here could be the initial model for use in MPI analysis for any country. 
It makes use of 30 indicators that were selected from ADBs commonly agreed MPIs, IMF 
MPIs/FSIs, Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), and Reinhart, Kaminsky and Lizondo 
(1998). The selection is based on economic rationale as well as findings of empirical studies on 
currency and banking crises involving various countries and regions. The MPI should preferably 
be available on a high-frequency basis (i.e. monthly). The MPI’s and the economic rationale for 
their inclusion and their characteristics (in terms of nature of detecting or predicting vulnerability) 
can be found in Table 6. An indicator is considereda leading indicator if it signals before 
vulnerability sets in and coincident if it signals during periods of vulnerability.  
 
These MPIs can be grouped into six broad categories, namely (i) Money, Credit and Interest 
Rate, (ii) Banking, (iii) Public Finance, External Debt and International Flows, (iv) Trade and 
International Reserve, (v) Stock Market and (vi) Business Tendency Survey. Some of the 
leading indicators need to be transformed to ensure that they are stationary and free from 
seasonal effects first. The level form should be adopted if the indicator does not display any 
trending or seasonal behavior. The list of leading MPI’s and the economic and financial 
rationales for their inclusion and their characteristic (in terms of nature of detecting or predicting 
vulnerability) can be found in Table 1. 
 
These MPIs should be compiled and updated regularly. Identification of MPIs is a dynamic 
process. Therefore, the list of MPIs should be updated on a regular basis depending on the 
emerging areas of concern in the economy and the financial sector. 
  
Macroprudential/Financial Soundness Analysis and Determination of Threshold Values 
 
These macroprudential/financial soundness indicators are compared to a set of country-specific 
benchmark figures or threshold values. A vulnerability signal is flashed when an observed 
outcome of a MPI crosses its threshold value. It indicates a departure or deviation from normal 
behavior in an MPI. For example, an abnormally large increase in real estate loan may signal 
high vulnerability in the banking or financial sector, which might lead to a banking crisis. MPIs 
should be monitored on a high frequency basis to detect any significant vulnerability or 
weakness in the economy in general, and the financial sector in particular, which could make a 
country susceptible to a currency or financial crisis. The higher the number of indicators flashing 




Table 1: List of Leading MPIs, Economic and Financial Rationale for Selection, and 
Predictive Characteristics  
 
 Rationale  Characteristic 
Money, Credit and Interest Rates     
M2, Growth, y-o-y  High growth rate of this indicator might indicate 
excess liquidity that may fuel speculative attacks on 
the currency and lead to a crisis. 
Coincident/leading 
Domestic Credit  
  Growth, y-o-y  
  Ratio to GDP 
Considered as an indicator of a monetary policy 
stance w/c is incompatible with the currency peg. 
Very high growth rates of domestic credit may serve 
as a crude indicator of the fragility of the banking 
system. Its ratio to GDP usually rises in the early 
phase of the banking crisis.  It may be that as the 
crisis unfolds, the central bank may be pumping 
money to the banks to alleviate their financial 
situation. 
Coincident/leading 
Real Money Market Rate/Inter-Bank 
Rate 
A sharp increase in this rate signals a tight liquidity 
situation in the banking sector, which can possibly 
lead to solvency problems 
Leading 
Lending Deposit rate spread  An increase above a threshold level possibly reflects 
deterioration in credit risk, as banks are unwilling to 
lend. 
 
Banking    
Net Bank Profits  
  Return on Assets  
  Return on Equity 
Unusually high profitability may be a sign of 
excessive risk-taking or imperfectly competitive 
financial sectors, but too low profits can indicate 
deterioration in credit quality or intense competition 
Leading 
Total Bank Loans to Total Deposits  A high ratio may indicate stress in the banking 
system and a low level of liquidity to respond to 
shocks 
Leading 
Credit to Private Sector, Ratio to GDP Over-investment of the private sector could lead to a 
deterioration in the quality of credit portfolios of the 
banking sector 
Coincident/leading 
Central Bank Credit to the Banking 
System 
A large increase in central bank credit to banks and 
other financial institutions often reflects severe 
liquidity or solvency problems in the financial sector 
Coincident/leading 
Household Debt  
  Growth, y-o-y  
  Ratio to GDP 
Households are more sensitive to changes in interest 
rates, income and asset prices. A too high proportion 
of loans to this sector may pose additional risk to the 
financial sector. 
Coincident/leading 
Real Estate Loans (Ratio to Total 
Loans) 
In the past, many financial crises have been caused 
or amplified by downturns in particular sectors of the 
economy spilling over into the financial system. This 
has often been the case for concentration in real 
estate, which can be subject to severe boom and 
bust price cycles. 
Leading 
Non-performing Loans (Ratio to Total 
Loans) 
High levels of NPLs indicate deteriorating asset 
quality of the financial system. 
Coincident/lagging 
Liquid Assets to Short-term Liabilities This indicator measures the banking system’s 
capability to meet short-term debt obligations. A too 
low ratio may result to liquidity problems if debtors 
decide to pull out their funds. 
Coincident/leading 
Public Finance, External Debt and 
Financial Flows 
  
Overall budget deficit to GDP  Large fiscal deficits could lead to a worsening of the 
current account position, which could in turn put 
pressure on the exchange rate 
 
Coincident/Leading 
Short-Term International Borrowing or 
External debt with maturities one year 
or less 
A large increase in short-term debt indicates 






Trade and International Reserves     
 Trade Balance to GDP   Deterioration in the trade balance could signal 
declining international competitiveness. It also leads 
to a worsening of the current account, which is often 
associated with currency crisis. 
Coincident/leading 
Real effective exchange rate  If real appreciation of a currency is not backed by 
corresponding productivity gains in the real 
economy, this implies a loss of international 
competitiveness which can be a possible source of 
vulnerability. Also, real appreciation of a currency 
that occurs in the context of a large current deficit is 
a source of increased vulnerability. 
Coincident/leading 
International Reserves 
  Growth, y-o-y 
  In months of imports 
A low and declining amount of international reserves 
signals possible problems for the country to meet 
international payment requirements and the 
economy's import demands. 
Leading 
Stock Market     
Composite Stock Price Index 
(1997=100) 
A sharp decline in stock prices may signal adverse 
market perception of the health of the stock market. 
Declining asset prices usually precedes financial 
crises. 
Leading 
Stock Price Earnings Ratio  A high and increasing stock price earnings ratio may 
signal asset inflation, which is unsustainable in the 
medium term 
Leading 
Business Expectation Survey 
Indicators 
  
Current Business Situation  
Expected Business Situation (next 6 
months)  
Stock of Finished Products 
  Industry  
  Wholesale and retail trade  
Employment (present situation)-here 
next quarter  
Financial Situation (present situation) 
BTS are able to capture current and future 
profitability trends. Answers on the current business 
situation as well as on the expected business trend 
in the next three to six months reflect the perceived 
profit assessment of managers which are not only 
important for the real economy but also has 
implications for the financial sector. 
Coincident/leading 
Sources: ADB Commonly Agreed MPIs (Bhattacharyay, 2004), IMF MPIs (IMF, 2004), Kaminsky, Reinhart and Lizondo 
(1998), Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000). 
 
 
Alternative methods to construct benchmarks/threshold values include use of: (i) historical 
average of MPI for countries with previous crisis experience, wherein an average around the 
period of crisis or periods immediately prior to the crisis could be used; (ii) prudential threshold 
values used by bank supervisory authorities or international financial institutions; (iii) average 
MPI of a similar country with a strong financial system; (iv) using econometric methods such as 
EWS models (v) average MPI of a similar country with a strong financial system and (vi) 
historical trigger points that caused a currency crisis.  A possible and safer alternative would be 
to use more than one threshold value for one indicator. 
 
Ideally, econometric techniques like the EWS signaling approach pioneered by Kaminsky, 
Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998) should be used to determine benchmarks figures/threshold values 
because these provide the most objective method in determining threshold values. However, 
this type of econometric technique requires long time series of high-frequency data and can be 
used only for countries that have a history of currency or banking crisis. However, this 
methodology of determining threshold values is not based on transparent or economic or 
financial criteria and is considered as a black box by policy makers. At the same time, the 




In the proposed system, country-specific threshold values are estimated for each MPI.  These 
MPIs are compared to a set of country-specific threshold values on a monthly or quarterly basis.  
A vulnerability signal is flashed when an observed outcome of an indicator crosses its threshold 
value. The higher the number of indicators flashing out signals at any given period indicates 
heightened vulnerability. 
 
The proposed framework deviates from the method introduced by Kaminsky, Lizondo, and 
Reinhart (1998) model by focusing on determining the magnitude of vulnerability in the system 
and identifying specific area(s) of concentration instead of estimating the probability of a crisis 
event. The proposed framework will also employ trend analysis to examine the actual values of 
those indicators that had significant jumps in the number of signals flashed or which had 
persistently flashed signals throughout the surveillance period. This will confirm if the signals 
given is unwarranted, stems from institutional or structural changes, or requires serious 
attention so that appropriate policy action and other corrective measures may be suggested to 
reverse or mitigate the vulnerability detected.  
 
Trend analysis of actual indicators of increasing vulnerability signals are also performed to 
reassess the extent of vulnerability and to provide a basis for any suggested policy actions. 
Depending on the magnitude of vulnerability as exhibited by one or more indicates, stress tests 
need to be perfumed for the areas of potential risk. For example, stress test could be performed 
for assessing shocks and risks in interest rate, commodity price (oil price), exchange rate, equity 
prices, credit and liquidity in banks and financial institutions. There is a need to analyze the 
underlying source of chronic vulnerability. Trend analysis of related indicators need to be 
performed. Appropriate policy actions are then formulated in order to address the vulnerability. 
 
This method is selected because it can be used by most developing countries, even those that 
do not have long-term data or crisis experience.  Threshold values used here are based mostly 
on the average of crisis affected countries using quarterly data between 1995 and 1997. In 
some instances, the average of a country with specific crisis experience (i.e. Korea for 
household credit) or an international standard (i.e. EU Stability and Growth Pact rule for budget 
deficit) was used.  A vulnerability signal is emitted when actual values breach the threshold 
value.  
 
It should be noted that macroprudential analysis under this framework should focus not only one 
symptoms-whether the MPI is above or below the threshold value - but on the underlying 
sources of chronic vulnerability. Therefore, trend analysis of related indicators with causal 
relationship with the concerned MPIs flashing vulnerability signals should be undertaken to 
assess the underlying sources of vulnerability. Appropriate policy actions are then suggested in 





Policy Analysis and Recommendations 
 
Continuous monitoring of financial system stability with respect to structural, institutional and 
macroeconomic aspects is not only crucial in detecting and preventing financial crisis but also in 
ensuring strong macroeconomic performance and effective implementation of monetary policy 




The results of the vulnerability assessment will be the basis for the policy recommendations. 
The kind of warning signals given provides a clue on the appropriate policy actions needed to 
address existing or potential weaknesses. Further trend analysis of underlying factors causing 
warning signals for a particular or a group of indicators will assist in policy recommendations. 
 
In general, policy recommendations can be categorized into (i) financial regulation and 
supervision policies, (ii) macroeconomic policies, such as fiscal, monetary and financial policies; 
and (iii) policies governing financial infrastructure, such as legislation, payments and 
settlements system and financial safety nets (See Figure 1). Ideally, alternative policy actions 
should be recommended for addressing specific vulnerabilities. Some examples of policy 
recommendations are given below. 
 
Typically, financial systems are exposed to credit risk, liquidity risk and market risk (which 
includes interest rate, exchange rate, and equity price risks). For assessing the soundness of 
the financial sector, the results of signaling methods should be interpreted in terms of credit, 
liquidity, and market risks. For example, addressing the credit risk of a country arising out of 
excessive growth of credit to GDP ratio, loan to deposit ratio and money supply may require 
several policy actions such as restrictions on further lending to certain over heated sectors, such 
as real estate and consumer finance and the ratio of each sector lending to total lending share 
capped at 10%. There is also a need for a closer monitoring of credit policy and credit appraisal 
system. Sharp increases in credit card default may necessitate the imposition of higher 
minimum salary requirement for credit card holder and setting up a credit card information 
bureau to avoid multiple cardholding 
 
For the fiscal sector, high levels of public debt, fiscal deficit and government consumption 
compared to the GDP of a country with narrow export base could be unsustainable in the case 
of an economic downturn, poor budgetary performance, orrise in real interest rates due to a 
world economic recovery. Effective fiscal management through better tax collection and public 
expenditure management is required to reduce the debt burden and assure debt sustainability 
against sudden shocks.      
 
There is also a time dimension to the range of possible policy recommendations. Policy 
recommendations can be categorized as short-, medium- and long-term in nature, in terms of 
the time required for their effective implementation. Usually, short- and medium-term policies 
are recommended for high frequency monitoring. 
 
Producing effective policy actions for recommendation relies heavily on the timeliness and 
reliability of available information. It is therefore important to monitor how near the actual figures 
are to their threshold value rather than wait for them to breach the threshold in order to have 
enough time to implement pre-emptive measures and avoid the crippling cost of a full-blown 
crisis. 
 
An Empirical Illustration 
 
An empirical illustration is given in this section to show how the proposed framework could be 
used to analyze MPIs using data from the Philippines in order to detect economic and financial 
vulnerability. It is based on 30 MPIs that were selected based on economic rationale as well as 
findings from empirical studies.      
 
As mentioned earlier, the surveillance should ideally be performed on a monthly basis. 
However, to show that this approach can still apply to countries with data limitations, quarterly  
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data for the last three years (2002 to 2004) was used. For illustrative purposes, the data 
provided here is on an annual basis with quarterly performance for 2004. Threshold values were 
derived from regional averages of pre-crisis data (1995-1997) unless otherwise specified.  
 
Determination of Threshold Values 
 
Philippines-specific threshold values are estimated for each MPI. Threshold values used here 
are based mostly on the average of crisis affected Asian countries using quarterly data during 
1995-1997. In some instances, the average of a country with specific crisis experience (i.e. 
Korea for household credit) or an international standard (i.e. EU Stability and Growth Pact rule 
for budget deficit) was used. This simple method is selected because it can be used by most 
developing countries, even those that do not have long-term data or prior crisis experience. 
Table 2 presents the methods or rationale for the computation methods for threshold values.  
 
Only Korea has pre-crisis data on household debt among the crisis-affected countries. It is also 
the only one with extremely high levels of consumer debt. Korea’s household debt was 
exacerbated by the excessive use of credit cards in the post-crisis years and culminated in the 
bankruptcy of many credit card companies in 2003, which led to a weakening of the domestic 
economy as personal consumption plummeted. The threshold value is computed using the data 
over the years 2001 and 2002 which represents the period prior to the burst of the credit card or 
“plastic bubble”. 
 
Table 2:  Methods of Determination of Threshold Values 
 Data  Source  for 
Threshold Values 
Determination of Threshold Value 
Money, Credit and Interest 
Rates 
  
M2, y-o-y growth   Economic Intelligence 
Unit, Bank of Korea 
Average of crisis affected countries from 
1Q1995 to 4Q1997 
Domestic Credit      
  Growth, y-o-y   IFS
4, ARIC
5 (for CPI)  Average of crisis affected countries from 
1Q1995 to 4Q1997 
Note: Domestic credit was deflated using the 
CPI prior to obtaining y-o-y growth rates  
  Ratio to GDP  IFS, Bank Indonesia (for 
GDP) 
Average of crisis affected countries from 
1Q1995 to 4Q1997 
Note: GDP is the sum of the current and 
previous three quarters 
Real Money Market Rate  IFS, ARIC (for CPI)  Average of crisis affected countries from 
1Q1995 to 4Q1997 
Note: This indicator was derived by 
subtracting inflation (derived from CPI) from 
the nominal money market rate 
Lending Deposit rate spread  Bank Indonesia, Bank of 
Thailand, Bangko 
Sentral ng Pilipinas, 
Bank Negara Malaysia, 
IFS (for Korea) 
Average of crisis affected countries from 
1Q1995 to 4Q1997 
                                                 
4 International Financial Statistics Publication of IMF  
5  Asia Regional Information System website of ADB  
 
21
Additional: Differential between 
Domestic and US real interest 
rate  
Bank Indonesia, Bank of 
Thailand, Bangko 
Sentral ng Pilipinas, 
Bank Negara Malaysia,  
Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve 
System (for 90-dat 
Treasury Bill), IFS (for 
Korea) 
Average of crisis affected countries from 
1Q1995 to 4Q1997 
Banking    
Net Bank Profits  ARIC  Average of crisis affected countries from 
1Q1995 to 4Q1997 
  Return on Assets   ARIC  Average of crisis affected countries from 
1Q1995 to 4Q1997 
Total Bank Loans to Total 
Deposits 
ARIC  Average of crisis affected countries from 
1Q1995 to 4Q1997 
Credit to Private Sector, Ratio 
to GDP  
ARIC  Average of crisis affected countries from 
1Q1995 to 4Q1997 
(Note: GDP is the sum of the current and 
previous three quarters) 
Central Bank Credit to the 
Banking System, y-o-y growth 
IFS, ARIC (for CPI)  Average of crisis affected countries from 
1Q1995 to 4Q1997 
(Note: Central Bank Credit to the Banking 
System was deflated using the CPI prior to 
obtaining year-to-year growth rates.) 
Household Debt      
  Growth, y-o-y   Bank of Korea  Average for Korea between 1Q2001 and 
4Q2002 
 
  Ratio to GDP  Bank of Korea, IFS (for 
GDP) 
Average for Korea between 1Q2001 and 
4Q2002 
(Note: Here GDP is the sum of the current 
and previous three quarters.) 
    
Real Estate Loans (Ratio to 
Total Loans) 
IFS and websites of 
Bank Indonesia, Bank 
Negara Malaysia, 
Bangko Sentral ng 
Pilipinas 
Average of crisis affected countries from 
1Q1995 to 4Q1997 
Non-performing Loans (Ratio to 
Total Loans) 
IFS and websites of 
Bank Indonesia, Bank 
Negara Malaysia, 
Bangko Sentral ng 
Pilipinas 
Average of crisis affected countries from 
1Q1995 to 4Q1997 
Public Finance, External Debt 
and Financial Flows 
  
Overall budget deficit to GDP  ARIC  Based on EU Stability and Growth 
Pact(SGP) of 1997 (Rationale: Despite 
existing controversies on the apparent 
arbitrariness of the SGP reference value, the 
3% ratio of government deficit to GDP can 
be considered as an international standard.)  
Short-Term International 
Borrowing or External debt with 
maturities one year or less 
ARIC  Average of crisis affected countries from 
1Q1995 to 4Q1997  
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Trade and International 
Reserves 
  
Trade Balance to GDP   IFS  Average of crisis affected countries from 
1Q1995 to 4Q1997 
Nominal exchange rate (y-o-y 
change) 
ARIC  Average of crisis affected countries from 
1Q1995 to 4Q1997 
International Reserves  IFS  Average of crisis affected countries from 
1Q1995 to 2Q1997 
(Rationale: The last two quarters of 1997 
was left out because this period was 
characterized by massive utilization of 
reserves as countries struggled to defend 
their currencies.) 
GIR in months of imports  ARIC  Average of crisis affected countries from 
1Q1995 to 4Q1997 
Stock Market     
Composite Stock Price Index 
(year-to-year change) 
Bloomberg  Average of crisis affected countries in 1997  
(Rationale: It is during this period that “hot 
money” started getting out of the region.) 
Stock Price Earnings Ratio  Bloomberg  Average of crisis affected countries from 





The selected MPIs are compared to a set of country-specific threshold values on a monthly 
basis. A vulnerability signal is flashed when an observed outcome of an indicator crosses its 
threshold value. The higher the number of indicators flashing out signals at any given period 
indicates heightened vulnerability. Table 3 below provides a summary of the surveillance 
results.  
 
Table 3: Vulnerability signals by Indicator Category 
Country X 
   2002 2003
1
st Quarter  (1Q) 
2004 
2
nd Quarter (2Q) 
2004 
Money, Credit and Interest Rates  2522  
Banking  1 1821  
Public Finance, External Debt and 
Financial Flows  4310  
Trade and International Reserves  3511  
Stock Market  4400  
Total 24 26 6 4 
 
 




Table 4. Vulnerability Signals by Each Indicators 
Philippines 
 Source  2002  2003  1Q2004  2Q2004 
Money, Credit and Interest Rates        
M2, y-o-y growth   EIU  0  0  0  0 
Domestic Credit           
    Growth, y-o-y   MPI table  0  0  0  0 
    Ratio to GDP  MPI table  0  0  0  0 
Real Money Market Rate/Inter-Bank Rate  IFS, ARIC  0  0  0  0 
Lending Deposit rate spread  BSP  1  3  1  1 
Differential between Domestic and US real interest rate IFS  1  2  1  1 
      subtotal    2 5 2 2 
Banking         
Net Bank Profits          
    Return on Assets  MPI table  1  0  0  0 
    Return on Equity          
Total Bank Loans to Total Deposits    0  0  0  0 
Credit to Private Sector, Ratio to GDP   IFS  1  0  0  0 
Central Bank Credit to the Banking System  MPI table  0  0  0  0 
Household Debt           
    Growth, y-o-y   MPI table  1  1  0  0 
    Ratio to GDP  MPI table  0  0  0  0 
Real Estate Loans (Ratio to Total Loans)  MPI table  4  3  1  0 
Non-performing Loans (Ratio to Total Loans)  MPI table  4  4  1  1 
Liquid Assets to Short-term Liabilities          
      subtotal    11 8  2  1 
Public Finance, External Debt and Financial Flows         
Overall budget deficit to GDP  ARIC  4 3 1 0 
Short-Term International Borrowing or External debt 
with maturities one year or less  ARIC  0 0 0 0 
      subtotal    4 3 1 0 
Trade and International Reserves         
 Trade Balance to GDP   IFS  0  1  0  0 
Nominal exchange rate, yoy change  ARIC  0 0 0 0 
International Reserves (y-o-y growth)  IFS  3  4  1  1 
GIR in months of imports  ARIC  0 0 0 0 
      subtotal    3 5 1 1 
Stock Market       0 0 
Composite Stock Price Index (y-o-y growth)  MPI table  0  1  0  0 
Stock Price Earnings Ratio  Bloomberg  4  4  0  0 
      subtotal    4 5 0 0 






(i)  The Philippines showed no major changes in the total number of vulnerability signals 
emitted over the surveillance period. It increased slightly from 24 signals 2001 to 26 in 
2003. The first two quarters of 2004 already posted a total of 10 signals (Table 7). The 
number of indicators that flashed vulnerability signals did not decline significantly, 
indicating that existing causes of vulnerability still need to be addressed such as 
continuing concerns over excess liquidity and the fiscal deficit.  
 
(ii)  Of the five indicator categories, three had higher number of signals in 2003 compared to 
2002 levels while the other two have gone down. Based on data from the first two 
quarters of 2004, it is possible that there will be no major deviation from 2003 except for 
Money, Credit and Interest Rates, which already has 4 signals in the first half of 2004 
compared to 5 signals for the whole of 2003 (Table 7). 
 
(iii)  Only the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans persistently flashed vulnerability 
signals from 1Q 2002 until 2Q 2004. (Appendix 2) 
 
(iv)  Table 8 below shows indicators whose signals in 2003 are higher than 2002. These 
indicators were limited to lending-deposit rate spread, the differential between domestic 
and US real interest rates and the y-o-y growth of international reserves. However, the 






Table 8: Macroprudential Indicators With Higher Number Of Vulnerability Signals  
In 2003 Compared To 2002 
Country X 
  2002 2003
1
st Quarter  (1Q) 
2004 
2
nd Quarter (2Q) 
2004 
Money, Credit and Interest Rates   
Lending-Deposit rate Spread  1 3 1  1
Differential between Domestic and US real 
interest rates  121  1
Trade and International Reserves             
Trade Balance to GDP  0 1 0  0
International Reserves, y-o-y growth  3 4 1  1
Stock Market   
Composite Stock Price Index (y-o-y growth)  0 1 0  0
 
Money, Credit and Interest Rate 
 
(v)  Of the six indicators under this category, only two gave out signals – the lending-deposit 
rate spread and the differential between US and domestic interest rates. Most of the 
signals occurred from 2003 onwards. Actual figures for the lending-deposit rate spread 
peaked at one percentage point above the threshold of 5.04% in 4Q2003. It has already 
gone down since and is only slightly above the threshold by the 2Q2004.  
 
(vi)  The differential between US and domestic interest rates, on the other hand, has been 
rising steadily since the second half of 2003, reaching 6.22% in 2Q2004, which is about 
1.2 percentage points higher than the threshold. This is driven mainly by recent  
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increases in key US interest rates and poses the risk of capital flight from the country as 
domestic assets become less attractive to investors.  
 
(vii)  The rest of the indicators in this category fell well below their threshold values. Domestic 
credit to GDP in particular, which is an important sign of banking fragility, has been 
relatively stable at around 55% since 2002, but it is the indicator that is closest to the 




(viii)  Of the ten indicators in this category, eight have available data. Only two indicator 
account for the bulk of signals in this category namely, the ratios of real estate loans and 
non-performing loans (NPLs) to total loans. 
 
(ix)  NPLs account for the bulk of the signals flashed for this category and have persistently 
flashed signals since 2002. Although NPL share in total loans is still high, it has 
remained relatively stable since 2002 and has been declining since 1Q2003. It posted 
13.77% as of 2Q 2004, just two percentage points above the threshold.  
 
(x)  The ratio of real estate loans to total has the next largest share in the total number of 
signals for this category. It has emitted signals since 1Q 2002, except for 3Q 2003. 
Nevertheless, actual figures are quite stable. It hovers at less than one percentage point 
higher than the 11.6% threshold. It also does not differ much from the Philippines’ pre-
crisis average of 12.14%.  
 
(xi)  Net banks profit, measured by return on assets and equity, is available only on an 
annual basis. It gave out a signal in 2002 and none in 2003. However, even with an ROA 
of 1.2 in 2003, bank profitability basically continued to perform poorly given that it is only 
slightly above the threshold of 1.07% and significantly below the country’s pre-crisis 
average of 1.92%. This may be due in part to tighter prudential regulation, a large 
proportion of NPLs and weak business activities. 
 
(xii)  Since household debt has no available pre-crisis data, Philippine figures are compared 
to Korea’s since the latter underwent a consumer debt driven crisis in 2003. As a ratio of 
GDP, this indicator poses no threat to the Philippines at the moment because it has a 
relatively low level of household credit, ranging from 1.6 to 2.26 over 2001 to the first half 
of 2004. This is just a fraction of Korea’s average pre-crisis (from 2001 to 2002) figure of 
54.7%. Likewise, household credit growth is not an immediate source of vulnerability. It 
exhibited strong, double-digit growth in the range of 20%-34% from 2Q 2002 to 1Q 2003 
which is comparable to Korea’s 24.85%. However, growth decelerated to single-digit 
figures thereafter and even declined by 11% in 1Q 2004. 
 
(xiii)  Credit to the private sector relative to GDP has generally been on a downward trend. It 
was around 72% in 1Q 2001 (the only time that it breached the threshold of 70%), 
gradually declined over the years and stands at about 59% by 2Q 2004.  
 
(xiv)  Although the number of signals in this category did not decline significantly, giving out a 
total of 11 signals in 2002, 8 in 2003 and 3 in the first half of 2004, actual figures show a 
definite improvement in the stability of the sector and a general decline in vulnerability 




Public Finance, External Debt and Financial Flows 
 
(xv)  Only the budget deficit flashed in this indicator category almost throughout period. The 
threshold value is set at 3% of GDP deficit, which is the benchmark, set by the EU for its 
members. For the most part, this indicator is much higher than the threshold ranging 
from 5-6%. The deficit stood at 3.9% of GDP by the end of 2002, inching upward to 
4.64% by the end of 2003. This indicates that government efforts to curb excessive 
public spending and to improve revenue generation have so far failed to seal the gaping 
fiscal hole.  
 
(xvi)  Despite the growing deficit, indicators for short-term external debt had flashed no signal. 
It remained stable and well below the country’s pre-crisis average over the observation 
period. 
 
Trade and International Reserves 
 
(xvii)  This set of indicators is generally healthy for Country X. From 2001 to 2003, international 
reserves (y-o-y growth) account for almost all the signals in this category. However, 
there is no indication of vulnerability in this area because when reserves are measured 
in terms of months of imports it is significantly above the threshold of 4 months.  
 
(xviii)  Trade balance to GDP only gave out one signal throughout 2002 to the first half of 2004. 
It fell slightly below the threshold of -0.89% in 2Q 2003. Clearly, there is no immediate 
threat in this area since remained above the threshold for the most part in the last three 
years.  
 
(xix)  Supporting data show that there is no immediate cause for concern in this category. 
Although the total number of signals rose from 3 in 2002 to 5 in 2003, it already dropped 




(xx)  The two indicators in this category both gave out signals over 2002- to 2004 but most of 
it was given out by the stock price-earnings ratio. This particular indicator was 
consistently above the threshold value of 22% (derived from the five-crisis affected 
countries average in 1997) since the 1Q2002 to 4Q2003. It peaked at 400% in 3Q2002 
and started declining since then. By the 1Q2004 it has already dropped to 18.8% and 
declined further to 16.5% by the 2Q. However, the stock price index has been relatively 
flat since 2001, implying that corporate earnings have been weak over the period when it 
gave out signals. 
 
(xxi)  The y-o-y growth of the composite stock price index only gave out one signal throughout 
the period covered by this paper. It declined by 26% in 1Q 2003, breaching the –23.25% 
threshold. This may be the market’s reaction to the exceptionally high stock price-
earnings two quarters before it. It also declined in the last quarter of 2003 although it did 
not breach the threshold. 
 
Business Tendency Survey (BTS) 
 
(xxii)  It appears that business sentiment was generally improving towards 2003, since the 
number of signals for all five indicators in this category were declining. However, the tide  
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has turned again 2004 as business sentiment showed a more cautious outlook as 
international interest and oil prices and domestic budget deficits continue to rise.  (Table 
9) 
 
Table 9. Business Expectation Survey Indicators 
    4Q
62003  1Q2004 2Q2004 3Q2004 
Current Business Situation         31.10            6.50          25.40          26.90  
Expected Business Situation (next 6 months)         20.00          30.60          36.40          50.20  
Stock of Finished Products         
    Industry           15.00            12.00  
    Wholesale and retail trade            (5.70)           21.90  
Employment (present situation)-here next quarter          (2.00)          (2.80)           4.90          16.80  
Financial Situation (present situation)        (27.50)        (32.80)        (31.40)        (25.70) 
Source: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas 
 
Policy Analysis and Recommendations 
 
(xxiii)  It is clear that the most pressing concerns for this country are the presence of high non-
performing loans and the substantial fiscal deficit because its indicators have given 
persistent warning signals. This is especially true for the latter because actual values are 
significantly higher than its threshold value.  
 
(xxiv)  Existing NPLs should be restructured at the earliest so that that lending to the private 
sector could be strengthened. High NPLs discourages financial institutions from 
expanding lending operations that choose to invest their funds in government securities 
and the like instead. This is evident with the decline of credit to the private sector relative 
to the size of the economy. 
 
(xxv)  Restraining the budget deficit, however, will be a bigger challenge. There is a pressing 
need to tighten expenditure and, more importantly, to improve revenue collection in 
order to reign in the deficit before it becomes unmanageable, especially in light of 
increasing global interest rates. The government would need to improve implementation 
of current tax laws, particularly in terms of addressing tax evasion, and legislate new 
taxes in order to improve revenue generation. On the expenditure side, the government 
would have to streamline the budget and trim-down cost. 
 
(xxvi)  In terms of potential vulnerability, the share of real estate loans may need to be 
monitored more closely since it breached the threshold consistently except for one 
period over 2003-2004 and is now approaching pre-crisis levels. The rise in oil prices 
and global interest rates may lead to an economic downturn that may soften demand for 





Systemic financial and currency crises in several developing counties and their contagion effect 
as well as in some developed countries and ongoing worldwide financial crisis originated in USA 
in 2008 revealed the limitations of the current state of the monetary and financial monitoring 
system in comprehensively addressing financial vulnerability leading to crisis. A crisis can cause 
economic, social, and political problems.  The cost of a financial crisis could be severe as a 
                                                 
6 Fourth Quarter data  
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result of severe reserve losses, output decline and poverty. In order to prevent financial turmoil 
and its contagion effect, monitoring the financial sectors as well as spillover effects of 
weaknesses to the real sector assumes great importance. The monitoring system should be 
able to detect the magnitude and nature of the economic and financial vulnerability at an early 
stage and suggest appropriate policy actions to address them, thereby preventing a crisis.  
 
There is no universally accepted standard or system for monitoring financial vulnerability. The 
development of MPIs for monitoring financial vulnerability is still a working in progress. It is 
almost impossible to predict the probability, timing, and kind of a crisis that will occur even with 
significant progress in techniques for MPI analysis, especially in EWS models. It may be better 
to use macroprudential analysis in crisis prevention rather than crisis prediction. A monitoring 
system should be cost-effective and not too complicated so that most countries can implement it 
for their high frequency monitoring.  
 
The proposed system in this paper can provide an initial framework for using MPI to detect 
vulnerability in the economy and the financial sector. As some crucial indicators do not have 
long time-series data available (i.e., corporate sector data, level of non-performing loans, 
household debt, international bank borrowing with less than one year maturity), it is not possible 
to compute threshold values. For these indicators, separate trend analysis on recent data 
should be performed to detect any large fluctuations or deviations from the trend. 
 
The vulnerability signals provided by the proposed framework can direct attention to particular 
issues or problems. Trend analysis can then be used to confirm if the indicators are indeed 
showing signs of vulnerability that may lead to an impending crisis or whether it is simply a 
result of institutional or structural changes. In order to avoid the virulence of the contagion 
among neighboring countries, there is a need for further strengthening of the regional 
surveillance mechanism, particularly the peer review process. 
 
The most difficult part of monitoring is to analyze, interpret, and translate the information 
contained in these indicators and their trends into something that could help direct policymakers 
and decision makers to appropriate policy actions. The interpretations discussed in this paper 
are meant to be starting points for national authorities to develop more country-specific 
monitoring schemes that take into account a country’s specific needs and circumstances.  
 
Another important task is to provide the analytical groundwork in devising the appropriate 
benchmarks or threshold values for high frequency data. However, it is to be noted that the 
macroprudential analysis should focus not only one symptom-whether a MPI is above or below 
the threshold value - but on the underlying sources of chronic vulnerability. This calls for further 
analysis of related data or indicators. 
 
Each indicator should be updated regularly (preferably fortnightly) and compared to its threshold 
value. In terms of policy action, it is more important to monitor how near the figures are to their 
threshold value rather than wait for them to breach the threshold. It is important, in this sense, to 
establish certain rules of thumb when interpreting surveillance results because there may be 
several options available. For example, one can opt for a disinflationary policy to avoid sharp 
deviations in real exchange rate relative to its historical trend, or adopt a policy that avoids 
unsustainable nominal exchange rate appreciation.  
 
Despite the appeal of using MPI analysis, its limitation should be recognized. The first major 
drawback of using MPI is its assumption that an economy has a consistent and regular pattern 
prior to a crisis. It relies largely on historical precedents but because of differences in the origin,  
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severity, and timing of crises, it is possible that indicators that were useful for one in the past 
may not necessarily be so in the future. Triggering events for different types of crisis also vary, 
i.e. indicators for a balance of payments crisis may not necessarily be as effective when used to 
predict a banking crisis. Therefore, the process of identification of MPIs should be dynamic in 
nature in order to assess the need for new indicators. Emergence of vulnerabilities in a new 
sector or a new type of vulnerability calls for the inclusion of new MPIs in the surveillance 
process. In view of the ongoing financial crisis, new MPIs concerning new sectors and 
institutions witnessing vulnerabilities such as off-balance activities of commercial and 
investment banks including risky financial derivative products, large financial institutions and 
housing mortgage markets need to be included in the surveillance process.  
 
Second, MPIs that are useful for crisis prediction in one country may not be for another, 
because of differences in the stage of economic and financial development, giving rise to 
significant variations in accounting and prudential standards, level of financial sophistication, 
and resilience of institutions, among others. However, tailor-fitting the set of MPIs to suit the 
unique economic characteristics of each country would give rise to the issue of cross-country 
comparability.  
  
Third, structural breaks in the time series arising due to changes in regulations or regimes can 
complicate MPI analysis. In light of these limitations, caution ought to be exercised in analyzing 
MPIs or more specifically, applying one smaller core set of leading indicators to a group of 
countries, and encouraging compilation of additional indicators that apply to special situations 
particular to each country.   
 
Fourth, there are measurement problems in capturing qualitative information.  For instance, 
poor banking supervision, which is identified as a major factor in the Asian crisis, is difficult to 
quantify and qualitative assessments may vary significantly. Other factors that are possibly 
important in predicting a crisis but are difficult to measure include the quality of corporate 
governance, independence of the central bank, reliability of the legal system, political stability, 
and other institutional qualities.  
 
Existing methods for MPI analysis have their own advantages but much still needs to be done to 
improve these techniques. For instance, there is no universally accepted or independently 
determined set of benchmark or threshold values for each MPI, yet it is an important feature of 
economic and financial surveillance, and is even used in EWS models to predict the occurrence 
of a crisis (Bhattacharyay, 2004).  
 
Further development of deeper, transparent and more liquid financial markets; strengthening 
financial institutions and their supervision and regulation; more transparent and efficient 
monetary and financial policies will be essential to prevent future crises, financial instability, and 
minimize the after-effects of a crisis in the region. Measures such as greater central bank 
independence, strengthening prudential supervision and regulation of financial markets 
including large financial institutions, improving legal infrastructure, enhancing corporate 
governance and greater policy transparency need to be exercised. 
 
Finally, the last segment of this paper focuses on some of quantitative aspects of crisis 
monitoring. However, it is important to keep in mind the importance of the qualitative aspecs of 
crisis monitoring models should be allowed to make decision for us. However, models are just 
tools to help management in decision making. Management decisions aided by objective 
quantitative models help reduce vulnerability and economic losses, but the experience and 
judgment of the analyzer is the most important factor. There are several qualitative factors in a  
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model, such as the parameters and modeling assumptions used, as well as choices that relate 
to characteristics of the underlying data and the historical period form which the data was 
drawn.  Vulnerability management tools, including the judgment and experience of the technical 
staff need to be strengthened continuously. Also macroprudnetial analysis requires an inter-
disciplinary team with financial economists, banking and financial experts, financial institutions 
supervision experts, accountants, economists, econometricians, corporate sector experts, 
statisticians etc. The scope of capacity building in monitoring is still wide among developing 
countries.  Technical training should be provided to ministries of finance, central banks, capital 
market supervisory authorities and other relevant supervisory authorities to enable them to 
perform meaningful interpretation and analysis of MPIs. Effective monitoring calls for a high 
degree of experience in analyzing the quantitative MPIs, coupled with informed judgment on the 
adequacy of the institutional and regulatory framework of the concerned country.  
 
The virulence of the contagion of a systemic crisis among neighboring countries as well as 
among trade partners shows the importance of an appropriate and effective regional 
surveillance mechanism, including the peer review process to prevent or detect future crises, 
and financial instability or to minimize their impacts in the region. At the same time, the 
worldwide financial crisis of 2008-2009 calls for an effective global surveillance system 
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Appendix 1: List of ADB Commonly Agreed MPIs (Bhattacharyay) 
 
 
External Debt and Financial Flows 
1.  Total Debt (% of GDP) – ratio of total debt on nominal GDP. 
a.  …of which public debt 
b.  …of which private debt  
2.  Long Term Debt (% of total debt) – ratio of long-term debt to total debt. 
3.  Short Term Debt (% of GDP) – ratio of short-term debt to nominal GDP. 
4.  Short Term Debt (% of total debt) – ratio of short-term debt to total debt. 
5.  Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) – ratio of foreign direct (expressed as flows) investment to nominal GDP. 
6.  Portfolio Investment (% of GDP) – ratio of portfolio investment (expressed as flows) to nominal GDP. 
 
Money and Credit 
7.  M1 Growth (%) – percent difference from previous period. M1 are liabilities of the monetary system consisting of 
currency and demand deposits. 
8.  M2 Growth (%) – percent difference from previous period. M2 equals M1 plus quasi-money. 
9.  Money Multiplier (Ratio) – ratio of M2 to money base. Money base is the sum of currency in circulation, reserve 
requirement and excess reserves (with the central bank).  
10.  M2 (% of International Reserves) – ratio of M2 to international reserves. 
11.  M2 (% of GDP) – ratio of M2 to nominal GDP. 
12.  M2 to international reserves growth – the growth rate of M2 over international reserves.  
13.  Quasi money (% of GDP) – ratio of quasi money to nominal GDP. 
14.  Money Base Growth (%) – percent difference from previous period. 
15.  Central Bank Credit to the Banking System  – Central Bank’s credit to the banking system. 
16.  Growth of Domestic Credit (%) – percent difference from previous period. Consists of net claims from central 
government, claims on official entities and state enterprises, and claims of private enterprises and individuals. 
17.  Domestic Credit (% of GDP) - ratio of domestic credit to nominal GDP. 
18.  Credit to Public Sector (% of GDP) – ratio of credit to public sector to nominal GDP.  
19.  Credit to Private Sector (% of GDP) – ratio of credit to private sector to nominal GDP. 
20.  Capital Adequacy Ratio (%) - ratio of total capital on risk weighted assets (threshold value is 8% meaning that 
the ratio should not be less than this value). Ratio of Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital to risk-weighted assets. Tier 1 capital 
includes issued and paid-up share capital, noncumulative preferred stock, and disclosed reserves from posttax 
retained earnings.  Tier 2 capital can include a range of other entities. These are undisclosed reserves that 
passed through profit and loss account, conservatively valued revaluation reserves, revaluation of equities held 
at historical cost (at a discount), some hybrid instruments, general loan loss reserves (up to 1.25 % of risk 
weighted assets), and subordinated term debt. 
21.  Liquidity Ratio (%) – The ratio of commercial banks’ liquid assets to total assets: (a) domestic liquid asset ratio 
and (b) foreign liquid asset ratio. 
 
Banking 
22.  Bank Capital (% of total asset) – ratio capital equity including reserves, profits, and loss to total assets. 
23.  Total Assets (% of GDP) – ratio of total assets (as in Monetary Survey without interbank positions) to nominal 
GDP. 
24.  Growth of Total Assets (%) – percent growth from previous period. 
25.  Share of 3 Largest Banks (% of total asset)  
26.  Net Operating Profits (as % of average assets)  
27.  Loan-Loss Provisions (% of nonperforming loan) – ratio of loan loss provision to nonperforming loans  
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28.  Nonperforming Loans (% of total loan) – ratio of nonperforming loans 
29.  Loans to the Key Economic Sector & (% of total loans) 
30.  Real Estate Loans (% of total loans) – ratio of real estate loans to total loans. 
31.  Total Loans (% of total deposits) – ratio of total loans to total deposits (i.e., demand deposits, savings deposits, 
time deposits.) 
32.  International liability from banks with maturities, total (mn US$) – total international liability from commercial 
banks. 
a. Short-term  borrowing 
b.  Long-term borrowing – more than one year 




Interest Rates (mean rate) 
(In case of monthly data average of daily rates, quarterly data monthly averages are to be applied) 
34.  Central Bank Lending Rate (a.o.p.) - end of period; rate at which the monetary authorities lend or discount 
eligible paper for deposit money banks. 
35.  Commercial Bank Lending Rate (a.o.p.)/ Prime Rate - average of period; ratio of commercial bank lending rate to 
prime rate. Prime rate refers to the short- and medium-term financing needs of the private sector.  
36.  Money Market Rate/Inter-Bank Rate (a.o.p.)- average of period; rate at which short-term borrowings are effected 
between financial institutions. 
37.  Short-term (3 mos.) Time Deposit Rates – interest rates of savings account held in a financial institution for 3 
months or with the understanding that the depositor can withdraw only by giving a notice. 
38.  Long-term (12 mos.) Time Deposit Rates – interest rates of savings account held in a financial institution for 12 
months or with the understanding that the depositor can withdraw only by giving a notice. 
39.  US$ (international market)/Domestic Real Deposit Interest Rate – unweighted averages of offered rates quoted 
by at least five dealers early in the day for 3-month certificates of deposit in the secondary market. 
40.  Bond/Treasury Bill Yield (short-term) – yield to maturity of government bonds (short-term) 
41.  Bond/ Treasury Bill Yield (long-term) – yield to maturity of government bonds (long-term) 
 
Stock Markets and Bonds 
42.  Foreign Share in Trading (% of Total Volume of Trading) – proportion of foreign share in trading to total volume 
of trading. 
43.  Share of 10 Top Stocks in Trading (% of Total Volume of Trading) – proportion of top 10 stocks in trading to total 
volume of trading. 
44.  Composite Stock Price Index (Capital City; in national currency unit) – equity price index of national capital city 
and expressed in national currency unit. 
45.  Composite Stock Price Index Growth (Capital City) – percent difference from previous period of equity price 
index; end of period and based on national currency unit. 
46.  Composite Stock Price Index (Capital City; in US$)– equity price index of national capital city and expressed in 
US$. 
47.  Market Capitalization (% of GDP) – ratio of market capitalization to nominal GDP. Market Capitalization refers to 
the total market value of stocks or shares. 
48.  Stock Price Earning Ratio  
 
Trade Exchange and International Reserves 
49.  Export Growth (%) – export growth (fob) percent difference from previous period. 
50.  Import Growth (%) – import growth (cif) percent difference from previous period. 
51.  Trade Balance (mn US$) – difference between exports (fob) and imports (cif)  
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52.  Current account deficit/surplus (mn US$) 
53.  Exchange Rate (average of period) – national currency unit to the US$ 
54.  Exchange Rate (end of period) – national currency unit to the US$ 
55.  Real Effective Exchange Rate – ratio of an index of the period average exchange rate of a currency to a 
weighted geometric average of exchange rate for the currencies of selected countries adjusted for relative 
movements in national prices of the home country and the selected countries. Refers to the definition used in 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics series. 
56.  International Reserves (mn US$) – international reserves include total reserves minus gold plus gold national 
valuation. 
57.  Growth of International Reserves (%) – percent difference from previous period. 
58.  International Reserves (% of imports) – ratio of international reserves to total imports. 
 
 
Business Survey Data (Manufacturing, Construction, Trade, Services) 
59.  Assessment of Current Business Situation  
60.  Expectations on Business Situation in Next Months/Quarters  
61.  Limits to Business (Present Situation)  
62.  Stocks of Finished Products (Present Situation)  
63.  Assessment of Order Books  
64.  Selling Prices (Future Tendency)  
65.  Employment (Future Tendency)  
66.  Financial Situation (Present Situation)  
67.  Access to Credit (Present Situation)  







Appendix 2: Core Set of Leading MPI (Bhattacharyay and Nerb) 
Type of Indicator*  Title  Characteristics 
    
Money and Credit     
 7.                          M1 Growth (in %)   leading 
 8.                    M2 Growth (in %)   leading 
 4. (additional)   M3 Growth (in %)   leading 
 15.                    Central Bank Credit To Banking System   coincident/leading 
 16.                     Domestic Credit Growth (in %)   coincident/leading 
 17.                      Domestic Credit Growth (in % of GDP)   coincident/leading 
 19.                      Credit to Private Sector (in % of GDP)   coincident/leading 
    
Banking      
26.                        Net Bank Profits (in % of total assets)   Leading 
31.                         Total Bank Loans (in % of total deposits)   Leading 
33.                         International Borrowings with maturities one year and less 
(mn. US$)  
Leading 
6. (additional)          Real Estate Loans   Leading 
    
Interest Rates       
36.                        Money Market Rate/Inter Bank Rate   Leading 
    
Stock Markets and Bonds      
44.    Composite Stock Price Index   Leading  
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47.     Market Capitalization (as % of GDP)   Leading 
48.      Stock Price Earning Ratio   Leading 
   
Trade Exchange and International Reserves     
    
55.    Real Effective Exchange Rate   coincident/leading 
56.     International Reserves   leading 
    
Business Survey Results       
59.                 Current Business Situation                                  
coincident/leading 
60.                  Expected Business Situation (next 6 months)             coincident/leading 
62.                    Stocks of Finished Products                                
coincident/leading 
65.                     Employment (Present Situation)                          
coincident/leading 
66.                      Financial Situation (Present Situation)   coincident/leading               
Note: For reference purposes, the numbering is based on the list of ADB Commonly Agreed Indicators found in Table 4. 
Source: Bhattacharyay and Nerb (2002)  
 
Appendix 3 
Core Set of IMF FSIs 
  
Deposit-takers  
Capital  Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets 
Regulatory Tier I capital to risk-weighted assets 
Non Performing Loans net of provisions to capital 
Asset quality  Nonperforming loans to total gross loans 
Sectoral distribution of loans to total loans 
 
  
Earnings and profitability  Return on assets (net income to average total assets) 
Return on equity (net income to average equity) 
Interest margin to gross income 
Noninterest expenses to gross income 
  
Liquidity  Liquid assets to total assets (liquid asset ratio) 
Liquid assets to short-term liabilities 
  
Sensitivity to market risk  Duration of assets 
Duration of liabilities 
Net open position in foreign exchange to capital 
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Encouraged Set of IMF FSIs 
 
Deposit-takers Capital  to  assets 
Large exposures to capital 
Geographical distribution of loans to total loans 
Gross asset position in financial derivatives to capital 
Gross liability position in financial derivatives to capital 
Trading income to total income 
Personnel expenses to noninterest expenses 
Spread between reference lending and deposit rates 
Spread between highest and lowest interbank rate 
Customer deposits to total (non-interbank) loans 
Foreign currency-denominated loans to total loans 
Foreign currency-denominated liabilities to total liabilities 
Net open position in equities to capital 
Other financial corporations  Assets to total financial system assets 
Assets to GDP 
Nonfinancial corporations  Total debt to equity 
Return on equity  
Earnings to interest and principal expenses 
Net foreign exchange exposure to equity 
Number of applications for protection from creditors 
Households  Household debt to GDP 
Household debt service and principal payments to income 
Market liquidity  Average bid-ask spread in the securities market 1/ 
Average daily turnover ratio in the securities market 1/ 
Real estate markets  Real estate prices 
Residential real estate loans to total loans 
Commercial real estate loans to total loans 
1/ Or in other markets that are most relevant to bank liquidity, such as domestic foreign exchange 
markets. 
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